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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of farm-level risk on bank 
performance in the state of North Dakota. Farm-level risk has been quantified into a single 
measure of the volatility of net farm income. Bank performance was examined through two 
profitability ratios, ROE and ROA, as well as a measure of liquidity risk, the financing gap ratio. 
Using random effects regression model, relationships between performance measures and bank-
specific, agricultural and macroeconomic variables were examined. Panel data from banks and 
farms in North Dakota for the years 2005-2014 were included. Each type of variable showed 
significance to performance ratios indicating meaningful relationships with internal factors and 
macroeconomic factors alike. Results also showed that variability in business operations of bank 
financed companies is also relevant to bank performance. Continued risk management within 
financial institutions is vital to maintaining or increasing performance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As the globalization of companies throughout the world continues to increase, the global 
economy becomes more codependent. Recent world economic conditions have proven to be 
highly volatile; uncertainty in one country or region of the world has more visible impacts on 
other countries. This is particularly relevant in the United States; because of this country’s 
economic size and impact, the US has seen itself become more susceptible to fluctuations in 
other countries. While many aspects of the global and national economy tend to be affected by 
global volatility, the agriculture industry remains highly sensitive to fluctuations globally and 
nationally alike.  
An overarching factor that has had impacts on the world agricultural industry is 
technological advancements. Technology is a major part of agriculture just as it is throughout 
other industries; it factors into all levels of production within the industry. In recent history 
technological advancements in this industry have improved not only efficiency of production but 
the effectiveness as well. Advancements in genetics, precision planting, harvesting and tracking, 
erosion protection techniques and improvements in food safety, are all integral in the current 
world agricultural industry. 
Due to the high levels of technological advancement, the world is currently facing a new 
problem: abundant supply, low usage, and low prices. Early 2015 saw an encouraging outlook 
that China would be increasing their imports of US food exports (Radford 2015). However, 
Chinese imports of the major commodities decreased rapidly in August of 2015. This was a solid 
indication that low international prices had lost their attractiveness as the seasonal demand 
decreased and industries downstream in the production system remained weak (Radford 2015). 
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China chose to devalue their currency on August 11, 2015 (Cendrowski 2015). This not 
only made US dollar-denominated commodities more expensive for holders of the Chinese 
currency, but also affected other areas of trade like fossil fuels and manufacturing. As the market 
fluctuated, China reduced coal, iron ore, and crude oil imports significantly. Their decreased 
demand for US exports across multiple industries affected prices of those related commodities 
here in the US (Radford 2105).  
In addition, competition exists from South American markets with commodities available 
at typically lower prices than the US. Major political changes in South American countries, 
specifically Brazil and Argentina which are integral producers of soybeans, have had an impact 
on the US economy as well (Brown 2016). With new leaders and upcoming policy changes, 
investors are optimistic in these emerging markets. These governmental changes are attractive to 
investors because in the world environment there is potential for growth despite the high 
potential risk involved and any added investment options are taken advantage of. In addition, the 
markets are moving in sync with one another; emerging markets in these countries are driven by 
such factors as commodity prices and US interest rates (Brown 2016). However, the risk lies in 
the fact that both countries rely on China importing their commodities and the risk that new 
leaders will fail to make policy changes.  
The strength of the United States dollar affects trade with not only South American 
countries like Brazil and Argentina but also with Russia. The Russian ruble has been weakened 
in recent years because of fluctuations in the oil industry (Kottasova 2016). It’s important to note 
that Russia and its neighbor Ukraine have become major exporters of grain and thus positioned 
themselves as important players in the world agriculture industry. 
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In March of 2014, Crimea, formerly a portion of Ukraine, was annexed into the Russian 
Federation (BBC News 2016). With the annexation came many adjustments for both Ukraine 
and Russia. Russia faced sanctions from Western countries that targeted Russia’s state finances, 
energy and arms sectors, as well as placing asset freezes and travel bans on many of senior 
Russian officials and separatist leaders. In retaliation, Russia has placed an embargo on a wide 
range of foods, which affects food exporters in the Western world (BBC News 2016).  
Many hoped increasing agriculture development of Ukraine would result from the major 
conflict with Russia. Recent policy changes in the European Union have helped this development 
become reality. Policy changes now allow genetically modified commodities to be produced in 
Ukraine where they were banned previously. While agriculture was a major part of plans to 
revitalize the country it hasn’t been impervious to recent economic declines. As of early 2015, 
agriculture only comprised roughly 10% of the economy in the country despite half of the land 
being arable (Demirjian 2015).  
These world conditions are forcing the US agriculture industry to face many challenges. 
On a national level, the US agriculture sector is adjusting to the world industry environment. In 
the US some of the major effects of world events have been decreasing prices, profit margins and 
loan interest rates. Supply and demand of commodities, both grain and livestock, have become a 
precarious balancing act. With outside pressures on the industry, adjustments have had to be 
made at all levels of production. 
The US dollar, particularly in its strength compared to foreign currencies, has become 
something of a setback for commodity prices in the US. With the currency exchange rates with 
competing nations favoring foreign production, US producers are in a position where their goods 
are priced so low costs are not being covered while at the same time the price is too high for 
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importers to purchase. Not only that, but countries with weaker currencies, like Russia, Ukraine, 
Brazil, Argentina and Canada, are expanding their crop acreage which will add to their 
competitive advantage in current conditions.  
With low prices and average to high input costs facing producers and those along the 
supply chain in the industry, profit margins are increasingly tight. The bright spot in the situation 
for the industry is the relatively low interest rates. This has saved many producers from exiting 
the industry altogether. With the shifts in industry prices, margins and interest rates, many 
farmers have faced increasing their credit demands with their financers, rebalancing their current 
debt, selling portions of accumulated assets or ceasing to do business entirely.  
Not only are grain exports affected by weak foreign currencies, but the livestock industry 
has faced issues as well. With grain prices being moderately low, this translates to low feed cost 
for livestock producers. For some producers that are involved in both crop and livestock 
production under a single firm, they’ve used their situation as an advantage to balance their 
decreased income for one commodity and increased income for the other. This comes with 
another challenge as the increased animal protein production levels will start to pressure meat 
prices downward of the year in 2016 (CoBank 2015).  
The issue of supply and demand in the commodities market is oftentimes out of the 
control of the producers. In the livestock sector of the industry, close attention to limiting their 
supply and avoiding flooding the market to remain in sync with anticipated meat demand will be 
the challenge faced by producers. As we go into the 2016 production year, there are adequate 
carry-in stocks that have yet to become burdensome. However, as the crop year progresses, the 
size of the harvest in the US will do the most in setting price expectations. Unless some natural 
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event occurs somewhere in the world, over-supply will continue to be a major factor in low US 
commodity prices as demand remains the same globally.  
Related forces outside of the agriculture industry in the US that have a significant impact 
on production are the monetary policy and the federal funds rate. With producers so heavily 
relying on credit to maintain operation costs and survive until harvest, it’s crucial to examine 
how the price of credit has remained low. Monetary policy in the US is defined by the Federal 
Reserve as its actions to influence the availability and cost of both money and credit (Labonte 
2016). Their statutory mandate is to work towards “maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates” based on the Congressional Research Report published in 
January of 2016. Price stability is addressed through inflation rates. Interest rates are determined 
by a target federal funds rate. The federal funds rate is the federally mandated rate that banks are 
allowed to borrow and lend reserves. After the financial crisis set in, the federal funds target 
decreased from 5.25% to a range from 0% to 0.25% in December of 2008. This rate was not 
adjusted until December 2015 when the Federal Reserve began rising interest rates slowly, 
aiming to maintain a stimulating monetary policy (Labonte 2016).  
Regulations within the financial industry affect the agricultural industry as well. The 
blame for the financial crisis of 2008 is largely attributed to banks accumulating significant 
amounts of sub-prime credit in their portfolios. Since then, one of the biggest changes in 
regulations that US banks have faced is the increase in the quality and amount of Tier 1 capital 
(Foster). The Basel Accords, which were in the process of being implemented when the crisis 
occurred, adjusted; Basel III requires banks with deficient capital to cut dividends substantially, 
sell assets, and issue new common equity to shareholders. These regulation changes have led to 
the liquidation of major banks such as Lehman Brothers, Wachovia and Washington Mutual. But 
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it also allowed the industry to successfully be recapitalized. The crisis taught regulators two main 
things: more attention needs to be paid to Tier 1 capital that permits financial institutions to 
survive a crisis and large banks need more capital than their smaller counterparts as they operate 
with large securities portfolios and have crucial involvement in market making activities 
(Foster).  
With the financial crisis in 2008 came the bursting of the housing market bubble. The 
results of both the financial crisis and the housing market burst had effects across the country. In 
North Dakota, however, many aspects of the state’s economy seemed immune to these 
oftentimes global repercussions. North Dakota saw increased home values, the lowest 
unemployment rate in the US, increased real state GDP, revenue surplus, and most notably, in 
July of 2011 North Dakota set a record for the most oil ever produced in a single month (Perry 
2011).  
However, as more time has passed since the crisis, North Dakota has found itself 
responding to national and global trends alike. Prices for commodities produced have fallen to 
moderate levels just as they are elsewhere in the country. This has led to decreased net farm 
income; based on data reported by the USDA Economic Research Service, net farm income 
dropped from $3,512 million in 2012 to just $295 million in 2014.  
In the last five years, North Dakota farms have been affected by global conditions, as 
represented in Figure 1. The upward trend from 2010 to 2012 covered most levels of production, 
cash income, intermediate expenses, and labor expenses. When crop cash receipts fell from 2012 
to 2013 and from 2013 to 2014, expenses continued to rise causing net farm income to decrease 
significantly. These economic conditions forced producers in the agriculture industry to rely 
more heavily on their financers, placing pressure on their local banks to expand credit lines.  
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Fig. 1. Value Added to the US Economy by the Agriculture Sector in North Dakota. 
Data Source: USDA Economic Research Service 
Banks of all sizes are essential for agriculture operations; the banking industry is the 
nation’s most important supplier of credit to agriculture. With increased demands for credit, 
banks have had constant growth in their loan portfolios. Rural banks allow focus to be placed on 
nonquantitative, or soft, information about their customers (Greeley 2013). While the main 
considerations of capital eligibility are accounted for, banks in rural areas, specifically North 
Dakota, have to extend credit to their customers which are more often farmers or ranchers. This 
leads to loan portfolios with considerable percentages diversified into the agriculture industry.  
The agriculture industry is susceptible to many intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Rural banks 
that rely on agricultural accounts may be more prone to changes in the agriculture economy. 
Banks are structurally different than most types of businesses. In general, agricultural companies 
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use credit and equity to finance operations that produce a product that is sold for profit. A bank’s 
source of income is the returns they make on lending money out to its customers. With these 
activities comes a certain level of risk. When loaning money to a customer there is the risk that 
they will pay late, pay less than what they owe, or not pay at all and default on the loan. Credit 
risk is a major risk banks face in day to day operations. With rural banks extending credit, and 
thus creating credit risk for themselves, to businesses that are operating in volatile conditions, 
does this create the potential for more risk to the bank’s profit than originally thought? 
As the economy in North Dakota shifts to adjust due to current conditions, how will the 
banks within the state be affected? It’s important to understand this portion of our economy as 
world conditions continue to change as well as circumstances at home. Previous years saw the 
state of North Dakota in a flurry of activity as the oil boom occurred and brought with it 
numerous jobs and significant income to the state and its residents. As the oil production wanes 
and slumps into a bust, North Dakota is facing a shrinking economy, falling employment, and 
deep spending cuts as the economy shrinks rapidly. By examining data that covers previous 
shocks in both the agriculture industry and the financial industry, we can use the historical 
responses and reactions to predict future activity.  
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of farm-level risk on bank 
performance in the state of North Dakota. Farm-level risk has been quantified into a single 
measure of the volatility of net farm income. Bank performance can be examined through several 
different measures. Given the financial structure of banks, in that high percentage of income is 
earned off of loans and leases which are categorized as assets, one ratio analyzed is the return on 
assets. Other variables included in the analysis include size dummies based on the amount of 
total loans and leases, whether the institution has 12% of their loan portfolio allocated to farm 
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loans, efficiency ratio, and the net interest margin. This paper will provide significant insights 
into the relationship between banks and agricultural institutions in the state of North Dakota that 
can be used to improve performance in the future.  
The following chapter of this paper entitled Literature Review will examine research 
previously conducted on this topic. The Methodology chapter describes the empirical and 
theoretical aspects of the model used to examine this problem. Details on the data used to 
quantify this issue are included in the Methodology chapter as well. Finally, the results of the 
analysis and conclusions to be drawn from the results are included in sections under the same 
names.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Credit Risk 
Credit risk and its associated capital requirements are defined through various models. In 
their 2005 paper, Ani Katchova and Peter Barry defined credit risk models and developed 
models specific for agricultural lenders. In the case of agricultural investments, most use the 
loss-based method to calculate losses due to credit risk because the debt and equity claims of 
farm businesses are not traded in active secondary markets (Katchova, Barry. 2005). Under their 
methods, credit risk is defined using the concepts of expected and unexpected loss. Expected loss 
(EL) is a measure that is found using historical data of past experience and is treated as a cost of 
lending for the business. Often expected loss is shown on a bank’s financial statements as loan 
loss allowances. Unexpected loss (UL) represent the maximum loss at a desired solvency rate 
with a probability of occurrence, α (Katchova, Barry. 2005). Credit value at risk or VaR is a 
measure that has been commonly used in recent years. Barry defines it as the sum of the 
expected loss, EL, and the unexpected loss, UL: 
 !"# 1 − & = () + +)(&) (Eq. 1) 
Credit value-at-risk represents the total loss that will be exceeded with the probability α 
and therefore the needed total capital to backstop credit risk at a desired solvency rate (1-α) 
(Katchova, Barry. 2005). 
Financial institutions and banks in particular are exposed to credit risk. Simply defined in 
The Handbook of Credit Risk Management, credit risk is the possibility of losing money due to 
the inability, unwillingness or nontimeliness of a counterparty to honor a financial obligation 
(Bouteille, Coogan-Pushner. 2012). As banks are in business to extend credit, their level of credit 
risk is highly significant to their business operations. Institutions such as banks and hedge funds 
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are able to use such activities to create a profit, therefore it can be inferred that not all credit risk 
is detrimental.  
Of those organizations exposed to credit risks, banks have the largest credit portfolios and 
possess the most sophisticated risk management organizations (Bouteille, Coogan-Pushner. 
2012). However, as the financial system has undergone crises in recent years, the environment of 
lending has changed in response. With higher regulatory capital requirements and low margins, 
banks have had a decreased desire to take on credit risk. However, most large banks are still 
exposed to a high level of credit risk which is combatted by distinct risk management divisions 
whose goal is to analyze and thoroughly examine the riskiness of individual borrowers. In 
conjunction with those activities, lenders more and more are using asset-backed lending 
practices. 
The asset-backed lending practice is defined as banks lending money or securities against 
the provision of collateral such as Treasury bonds or equity (Bouteille, Coogan-Pushner. 2012). 
In this practice, should the borrower fail to repay their obligation the institution can liquidate the 
asset to pay off part of or the entirety of the obligation. Asset-backed lending isn’t without its 
caveats as it often coincides that a borrower fails to pay because of fluctuations in the market that 
also devalue the assets being used as collateral on the loan.  
A single measure, such as VaR, shouldn’t be used to quantify whether a transaction will 
be good or bad with respect to credit risk. Using four standard parameters to analyze and 
compare credit risk exposures is a better approach (Bouteille, Coogan-Pushner, 2012). The 
exposure, default probability, recovery rate and tenor of the transaction should all be considered 
when deciding its significance. For the purposes of this study default probability will be 
discussed further in the following section.  
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Default Probability 
The probability of default is the likelihood that a borrower will fail to pay their 
obligation, or default, at some point in the future. This measure will never be zero. Even the 
strongest entity that has a very low chance to default can’t be written off because one never 
knows what could happen. As witnessed in the financial crisis of 2007-2008 in the United States, 
the notion of “too big to fail” no longer holds true.  
In 2007 the paper, “A Multi-objective Approach for the Prediction of Loan Defaults,” 
was published as a study that applied a multi-objective evolutionary optimization algorithm in 
generating decision rules for predicting loan default in a typical credit institution. The issue is 
presented as credit institutions adapting to growing credit risk scrutiny by performing in house 
rating and approval procedures on large transactions, typically over $5 million (Odeh, Koduru, 
Das, Featherstone, Welch 2007). Because of the higher cost of this method, statistical models are 
often used for scoring smaller volume loans. When managers and credit officials manually 
evaluate credit applications they do not face a single objective. Assuming bank officials have to 
attempt to optimize two or more criteria or goals at the same time, conventional optimization 
problems, which are designed for single objective optimization problems, are incapable of 
handling these problems (Odeh, Koduru, Das, Featherstone, Welch 2007).  
The proposed, multi-objective optimization algorithm approach offers the credit analyst 
more flexibility in customizing what aspects are included in the estimation process. 
Understanding that a typical credit institution has the goal to minimize portfolio loss, the paper 
uses fuzzy inference system for predicting loan default to allow expert knowledge to be 
incorporated in the credit appraisal process (Odeh, Koduru, Das, Featherstone, Welch 2007). The 
conclusion of this study presented cooperating results with prior studies using different 
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methodology. Namely, loan default is inversely related with owners’ equity. The study showed 
clear empirical evidence of strong indicators of default status. They found that if a business 
maintains low working capital and poor repayment history, then the business has a higher 
probability of defaulting on the loan (Odeh, Koduru, Das, Featherstone, Welch 2007).    
Another fundamental notion of default probability is that it increases with time. As time 
passes the financial strength of the borrower will tend to deteriorate and companies have a higher 
chance to default in the long term than the short term (Bouteille, Coogan-Pushner, 2012). 
Probability of default is not a measure that is readily observable. Therefore, there are different 
methodologies to quantify the measure. For the sake of this paper the method explained is the 
most commonly used methodology to assign a default probability to a counter party (Bouteille, 
Coogan-Pushner, 2012). Typically default probabilities are determined through a two-step 
process of assigning a rating to the counterparty and then examining the default probability of 
similarly rated counterparties.  
In 2014, a paper with a focus on default risk for agricultural lenders was published to 
examine two specific risks prevalent in agricultural activities. This paper proposed and estimated 
a default risk model that accounted for commodity price volatility and climate (Castro, Garcia 
2014). Knowing that banks have a standard technique of evaluating risks they’re facing by 
examining their portfolios and the risk associated with them, this paper strove to incorporate a 
default risk model into it. Through performance of stress tests on the portfolios of rural banks, it 
resulted in indications that while both climate and commodity price volatility do affect economic 
capital, climate factors have a larger effect than commodity price volatility (Castro, Garcia 
2014). 
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Credit Scoring 
“The State of the Art in Credit Evaluation” by Raj Chhikara was published in the 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics in 1989. Given the volatility of the agriculture 
environment and the economy in the US during the 1980s, this study sought to examine past 
credit-scoring models, recent developments and possible future research trends on this topic. 
“Most of the credit-scoring models…seek to provide predictions of default probabilities based on 
customer attributes” (Chhikara 1989). Various credit scoring models and approaches were 
examined in the paper. Many of the models examined had limitations; at the time the paper was 
written the focus of future research included possible advances in technology. It was stated in the 
conclusions of the paper that despite the “increasingly sophisticated techniques have been used 
to develop these models, their usefulness in dealing with the general credit-granting decision 
problem has been limited by their almost exclusive focus on assessing default risks” (Chhikara 
1989). 
By 2000, large financial institutions, specifically banks, had come to rely heavily on 
internal credit risk rating systems (Treacy, Carey 2000). They were viewed as integral methods 
to measure and manage their exposure to credit risk from both individuals and portfolios. The 
paper by Treacy and Carey described those internal rating systems that were at use in the 50 
largest US banking systems (Treacy, Carey 2000).  They sought to illuminate the relationships 
between the forms and functions of the internal rating systems. Through the course of the 
research they found that there are a minimum of 11 specific characteristics of the internal rating 
systems that should be promoted more than they already are (Treacy, Carey 2000). They also 
found that over time, internal ratings have grown both in practice and importance. They  
determined that no one internal rating system will always be right in every circumstance. 
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However, not having some system to evaluate and manage risk within an institution that lends 
credit would be detrimental to the businesses’ success.  
As already discussed, a singular measure won’t give a clear picture of the state of an 
individual whether it be an institution or an individual borrower. Similarly, a credit rating is a 
relative measure of a firm’s financial strength. It simply implies that higher grades have less 
chance of default than a lower grade. But to come up with the credit rating a company’s 
operating environment, strength of management and other drivers of financial strength are 
analyzed and then assigned a grade. Ratings can come from internal measures or rating agencies. 
Once ratings are assigned, the historical data for similarly rated institutions is examined for the 
historical default frequency based on that rating.  
An important aspect of credit ratings is the idea of credit score migration. In 2002, Peter 
Barry, Cesar Escalante and Paul Ellinger published a paper in the Agricultural Finance Review 
on “Credit Risk Migration Analysis of Farm Businesses.” At the time migration analysis was 
deemed a relatively recent method behind analyzing credit risk. “The migration approach to 
credit risk measurement is based on historic rates of movements of individual loans among the 
classes of a lender’s risk rating or credit-scoring system” (Barry, Escalante, Ellinger 2002). 
Migration rates are routinely utilized by major rating companies for bonds and other publically 
traded securities. Applying this concept to agricultural businesses only furthers credit providers’ 
insight into the risk in lending to them. The benefit of using this method is that it provides a 
“richer, more comprehensive perspective on credit risk and loan losses than relying solely on the 
measurement of historic default rates” (Barry, Escalante, Ellinger 2002).  
The analysis performed in the paper focused on farm data from Illinois farms; they used 
three financial indicators from annual farm-level data from 1985-1998. They had three 
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classification criteria: a credit-scoring model for term loans, a profitability variable, and a 
repayment capacity variable. The main results followed results from similar studies of credit risk 
migration. “Migration rates and related measures for the three classification criteria and the time 
sequences…results are consistent in that the frequencies are highest for remaining in the same 
class, the rates decline for movements to more distant classes and the incidence of downgrading 
tends to exceed the occurrence of upgrading” (Barry, Escalante, Ellinger 2002). With limitations 
on data, improved analysis relies on consistent data gathering from agricultural businesses. 
However, the analysis was able to “demonstrate the applicability of credit migration concepts to 
the evaluation of farmers’ credit risks” (Barry, Escalante, Ellinger 2002).  
Continued study of credit score migration was published in 2004 focusing on business 
cycles and migration trends. Phillips and Katchova tested whether migration probabilities differ 
across business cycles as well as whether they depend on previous period migration trends 
(2004). Using similar data that previous studies did, their paper built on the previous agricultural 
finance studies by applying additional migration analysis to the farm level data (Phillips, 
Katchova 2004). 
Their results of migration analysis were similar to the previous agricultural finance 
studies, such as the paper by Barry, Escalante and Ellinger. In examining the business cycles, 
results indicated that “farm businesses exhibit a greater tendency to upgrade when the national 
economy is in expansion and to downgrade when the economy is in recession” (Phillips, 
Katchova 2004). Statistical significance of the results suggest that such macroeconomic 
conditions do affect the financial performance of farm businesses, indicating the importance for 
agricultural lenders to include such factors in their migration analysis to minimize their credit 
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risk (Phillips, Katchova 2004). Including credit risk migration analysis is a significant way for 
lenders to examine the credit risk faced by lending to agricultural businesses.  
By 2005, further literature was published in the Agricultural Finance Review in an article 
titled “Credit Risk Migration and Downgrades Experienced by Agricultural Lenders.” In contrast 
to Barry’s paper in 2002, they used data from the side of the lender. Their study showed that 
“lender risk ratings are much more stable than ratings based on credit scores estimated from 
financial statements,” as well as specific borrower characteristics playing a more influential role 
than the type of agricultural enterprise (Gloy, Ladue, Gunderson 2005).  
In their study they acknowledged that “lenders consider both financial and non-financial 
factors” (Gloy, Ladue, Gunderson 2005). Because of this, it implies that there will be a 
difference in results when using lender credit risk ratings instead of ratings based on estimated 
credit scores (Gloy, Ladue, Gunderson 2005). Compared to results from the paper by Barry, 
Escalante and Ellinger, which utilized farm record data, this analysis had results showing 
substantially greater tendencies for borrowers to remain in their current credit risk class (Gloy, 
Ladue, Gunderson 2005). The general results indicate that lender risk ratings are more stable 
than ratings based on credit scores estimated from financial statements and highlight the 
importance of the role that non-financial factors play in assessing credit risk (Gloy, Ladue, 
Gunderson 2005). 
This paper will also utilize the analysis performed that determined the probability of 
default and the risk-rating class for loans in an agricultural setting (Featherstone, Roessler, Barry 
2006). Probability of default is an element in the equation that defines expected loss. The 
conceptual framework breaks the expected loss down into probability of default, loss given 
default and exposure at default. In this way the equation includes the aspects necessary to 
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examine credit risk and the capital adequacy of the institution: how much risk is present, the 
institution’s risk tolerance level, and the amount of capital that should be retained to offset the 
risk (Featherstone, Roessler, Barry, 2006).  In examining the individual loans, Barry used 
recommended criteria from the Basel Accord as well as adding other performance measures to 
accommodate the agricultural nature of the analysis. Their recommendations include measures of 
a firm’s repayment capacity, solvency, earnings, operating leverage, financial efficiency, 
liquidity, management, industry standing and collateral positions.   
After the financial crisis of 2008, banks began closer examination of the risk they 
exposed themselves to. A paper published in the Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics in 
2009, “Assessing Credit Risk in an Agricultural Loan Portfolio,” focused on the importance of 
credit risk models to banks in both Canada and the United States. In order to appeal to rural 
agricultural lenders, they created a study that “focuses on agriculture and identifies the key 
features of such a model” (Pederson, Zech 2009). 
The main objective for the study was to find a suitable credit risk model to use in 
agricultural situations. Examining models that include agricultural aspects require including 
certain characteristics of the data such as cyclical performance, significant degrees of inter-
correlation among default rates, historical default correlations, and economic cycle adjustments 
(Pederson, Zech 2009). They found that the direct approach, developed in their paper, to the 
lender’s credit risk modeling problem provided the flexibility needed to address those 
characteristics. The study showed that “agricultural lenders…can usefully employ their loan 
portfolio data to fulfill the regulatory requirements of internal capital assessment and test the 
Basel capital model assumptions of a single asymptotic risk factor and infinite portfolio 
diversification” (Pederson, Zech 2009). The implications of this study extend to not only internal 
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credit management for banks but also presented a strategy for credit lenders that, in the future, 
could “result in lower interest rates and increased safety and soundness of agricultural financial 
institutions in the United States and Canada” (Pederson, Zech 2009). 
Performance 
Profitability is similar to credit risk in that it’s more than a single measure to be analyzed. 
Rather, profitability is another measure of the strength of a company that requires examining 
more than one indicator or ratio. Some of the most common measures of profitability include the 
firm’s return on equity, return on assets and examining the profit margin ratio.  
In 2012, the Agricultural Finance Review published a paper titled “Drivers of agricultural 
profitability in the USA: An application of the DuPont expansion method,” which addresses all 
of these ratios. By using the DuPont expansion method, they examined the three ratios that make 
up return on equity: net profit margins, asset turnover, and assets to equity (Mishra, Harris, 
Erickson, Hallahan, Detre 2012). The goal of their study was to utilize the DuPont expansion 
method to “investigate the impact of demographics, specialization, tenure, vertical integration, 
farm type, and regional location on the three levers of performance” within the return on equity 
ratio (Mishra, Harris, Erickson, Hallahan, Detre 2012). 
Using farm-level data they used a “system of equations…to analyze the various factors 
that drive the components of ROE” (Mishra, Harris, Erickson, Hallahan, Detre 2012). This study 
went further than previous literature by using factors such as farm type, region and size. Their 
results showed that the main drivers of profit margins, asset-turnover, and asset-to-equity had 
some similar results, and are shown in Table 1.   
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Table 1  
Key Drivers of ROE Components 
 Profit Margins Asset-Turnover Ratio Asset-to-Equity Ratio 
Contracting   X 
Farm Size   X 
Farm Typology X   
Government Payments received X X  
Off Farm Income  X  
Operator Age  X  
Operator Education X   
Specialization X X X 
Vertical Coordination  X  
Source: Mishra, Harris, Erickson, Hallahan, Detre 2012. 
The Academy of Banking Studies Journal published a paper, “The Determinates of a 
Community Bank’s Profitability,” in 2013. Their purpose was to offer a possible methodology 
that could be repeated by commercial banks to find which of their products offered affected their 
net profit the most. The authors had results “to inform bank management of internal relationships 
between products, as well as to help explain which products most heavily contribute to bank 
profitability (Lamb, Harper, Minnis, Chuo 2013). The paper examined data from 2000 to 2012 
which includes the financial crisis and is reflected in data presented on bank failures during this 
time. They drew from the “disturbing trend regarding commercial bank failures” the importance 
of banks understanding their profitability and how it can be managed (Lamb, Harper, Minnis, 
Chuo 2013). 
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The study “presents a process for identifying the determinants of profitability of a 
specific community bank using sound statistical procedures” (Lamb, Harper, Minnis, Chuo 
2013). They created a sound model that is repeatable by any commercial bank wishing to 
identify the products offered that will affect profitability. They found both the independent 
variables that are most significant to net income as well as the limitations of their examination of 
the “information contained within the matrix and the interaction of each of the variables with the 
others” (Lamb, Harper, Minnis, Chuo 2013). “The explanatory power exhibited by the models 
indicates the value of the information resulting from the regressions” (Lamb, Harper, Minnis, 
Chuo 2013). 
Farm Economy in North Dakota 
The paper published by North Dakota State University in 2002, “The Role of Agriculture 
in the North Dakota Economy,” illustrates the importance of agriculture in the state of North 
Dakota and thus this analysis. Using both statewide and regional data, the report assessed the 
“role of agriculture in the North Dakota economy” (Leistritz, Coon, Lambert 2002). Their 
analysis revealed that over time, agriculture’s role in North Dakota’s economy has decreased in a 
relative sense. However, they show that it is still the “cornerstone of the state economy and 
remains the largest goods and services exporting sector” (Leistritz, Coon, Lambert 2002). They 
highlighted three main points of the importance of agriculture: it accounts for 25% of the basic 
economic activity and 36% of all exported goods and services, it directly employs almost 11% of 
the state’s workers, and the state “ranks second in the nation in the percentage of gross state 
product derived from agriculture” (Leistritz, Coon, Lambert 2002).  
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METHODOLOGY 
Data 
Data for this analysis was gathered for the eighty banks that are based in North Dakota 
and from the North Dakota Farm Business Management Association for North Dakota farm 
financial information. The data spans 15 years, from 2000-2014 which covers a span of time 
both before and after the financial crisis. Table 2 details summary statistics of data utilized in the 
regression. Table A1 describes sources and calculations, when appropriate, of individual 
variables. 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
B_ID 39 22.24056 1 77 
Year 2009.5 2.874148 2005 2014 
LquidityRisk -0.0563056 0.1515915 -0.5047092 0.7207313 
ROE 0.1039379 0.0617888 -0.22182 0.26416 
ROA 0.010239 0.005828 -0.01998 0.02474 
Size 11.51822 1.084987 9.498672 15.00062 
AgBank 0.5909091 0.4919857 0.000000 1.00000 
F_VOL 5.351105 1.460725 3.185315 7.45471 
F_VOL_1 5.591749 1.338361 3.769768 7.45471 
GDP 0.0346 0.02128 -0.0092 0.0652 
Crisis 0.10000 0.300195 0.00000 1.00000 
EFF 0.6627404 0.1314025 0.258 1.2405 
NIM 0.040089 0.0062161 0.0017 0.061 
EC_A 0.0964688 0.0201039 0.0559 0.1928 
NCO_LL 0.0030614 0.006808 -0.0247 0.0746 
F_LN 0.2973247 0.1673655 0.00000 0.6806467 
C_LN 0.1581629 0.0892062 0.0022848 0.6500131 
I_LN 0.0775707 0.0627622 0.0067817 0.4573408 
O_LN 0.0363074 0.0567153 0.00000 0.340554 
F_LN_G 0.1265661 0.9743558 -1.00000 18.2069 
T_LN_G 0.1403802 1.476387 -1.00000 33.14991 
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The reports of financial data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s website 
are all standardized and organized in the same manner, reports were therefore compiled for each 
of the banks based in North Dakota for the years 2000-2014. The financial statements that are 
provided by the FDIC contain useful information about both performance, financial structure, 
and demographics for each institution. This data was narrowed to the period of 2005-2014 to 
utilize five year moving averages for the performance variables, Return on Assets and Return on 
Equity.  
 
Fig. 2. Bank Performance Trends. Data Source Table A3. 
Figure 2 above shows the trends of annual averages across the state of North Dakota. 
Return on Assets remained stable across the span of ten years observed. Return on Equity in 
contrast fell after the financial crisis of 2008 and continued to fall until 2011 where it started to 
increase again. Liquidity risk was even more volatile in the years following the crisis. It fell to    
-9.67% on average for 2011 before increasing to -5.64% the following year. By 2014 the average 
liquidity risk ratio increased to -1.39%.  
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In addition to data regarding performance, data on the financial structure of the banks 
was also included and analyzed. Two of these measures, Net Interest Margin and Equity Capital 
to Assets ratio, remained overall fairly stable, with slight decreases over time. 
 
Fig. 3. Bank Financial Structure. Data Source Table A3. 
As seen in Figure 3, in 2009, one reporting year after the financial crisis of 2008, saw a 
slight peak in the ratio of Net Charge Offs to Loans and Leases. From 2007 to 2008, average net 
charge offs nearly doubled. When the average net charge offs doubled again from 2008 to 2009 
it increased that ratio given loans and leases increased at a much lower rate. This created the 
slight peak in the ratio’s trend line in Figure 3. 
Figure 4 illustrates trends in the annual average configuration of North Dakota banks’ 
loan portfolios. The main types of loans offered by banks and included here are separated into 
Farm, Commercial, Individual and Other loans.  
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Fig. 4. Bank Loan Portfolio Trends. Data Source Table A3. 
Over the time period examined there was relative stability in the portfolio weights. Farm 
loans stayed, on average, around 30% of the bank’s portfolio, decreasing slightly from 2009 to 
2011. Commercial loans decreased after the 2008 financial crisis. Individual loans overall had a 
downward trend, flattening slightly from 2008 to 2009. Other loans increased minimally from 
2008 to 2009 before continuing along a constant trend. 
We used data from the North Dakota Farm Business Management Association spanning 
this period of ten years from 2005-2014. The North Dakota Farm Business Management 
Association is an education program that has gathered actual farm records from over 500 farms 
enrolled in the program across the state. The information we utilized were the farms that had data 
observations at least 17 different times. The data set includes aspects from farm financial 
statements, primarily the balance sheet and the income statement. It also includes demographic 
information about the farms such as the farmers’ ages and years operating the farm. The variable 
created and used from the farm-level data set was our measure of farm income volatility.  
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Data gathered from the North Dakota Farm Business Management Association, 
specifically, net farm income from operations, was used to calculate an annual percent change 
for each reporting farm. This annual percent change was calculated using the following: 
 %/01 = (/012 − /01234)//01234  (Eq. 2) 
where %NFI is the percent change in net farm income from operations, /012 is net farm income 
from operations in time t, and /01234 is net farm income from operations in time t-1. This 
percent change was then used to find 5-year rolling averages for each farm. Using the 5-year 
average of annual percent change in net farm income for each farm, a yearly average for the state 
was calculated to represent annual farm income volatility. 
To include macroeconomic variables in the analysis, data on both Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and a dummy variable representing the financial crisis were run in the regression. 
GDP was found on the website run by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis, which is 
a part of the United States Department of Commerce. Using the data provided of US GDP in 
current dollars, an annual percentage change was calculated.  
 %678 = ($6782 − $678234)/$678234  (Eq. 3) 
where %GDP is the percent annual change in US GDP, $6782 is the real current dollar level of  
US GDP in time t, and $678234 is the real current dollar level of US GDP in time t-1.  
 
Fig. 5. Trend of Percent Change in US GDP. Data Source Table A3. 
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This representation of the United States’ economic activity on a national level was 
included in the regression as an independent variable. The trend in US GDP is illustrated in 
Figure 5. Given the time period examined, it’s understandable that there would be volatility in 
this measure of economic activity. The drop in the trend line coincides with the financial crisis 
and it’s lasting effects on the United States’ economy.  
Because of its potential effects on the variables examined in the regression, a dummy 
variable was added with a value of “1” for the year 2008 and a value of “0” for all other years.  
Empirical Model 
Return on Equity 
Return on Equity is a common measure used to examine a business’ performance. The 
ratio in its simplest form is:  
 #:( = 	<=>   (Eq. 4) 
where ROE is the Return on Equity, NI is Net Income and E is the Stockholder’s Equity. The 
ratio shows how much the company was able to profit in relation to how much of the company is 
owned by the company or its stockholders. ROE is considered a profitability ratio given it 
examines how the company is able to profit from the investment made by the company into itself 
and made by the stockholders.  
In addition to its simplest form, ROE has an expanded form, most often called the 
DuPont Model. This expansion allows for further examination of the possible factors of ROE. 
The DuPont Expansion Model is  
 #:( = 	<?2	=@ABC?DEF?G 	×	 DEF?GIB2EF	JGG?2G 	×	IB2EF	JGG?2G>KLM2N   (Eq. 5) 
Each portion of the expansion model is a different type of examination of a company’s 
performance. The first portion of the expansion, Net Income/Sales, is the equation for profit 
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margin and examines the company’s profitability. The second portion, Sales/Total Assets, is the 
equation for asset turnover and is a measure of a company’s asset management. Finally, Total 
Assets/Equity is known as the equity multiplier and is a measure of how a company utilizes their 
liabilities to finance their assets. The higher the ratio, the more a company is earning on their 
equity, proving to be efficient managers of the equity in the company. This ratio is comparable 
across companies within the same industries and overall market comparisons, and thus is widely 
used to analyze profitability. Some of the variables included in the regression relate back to this 
expansion method. Measures of size, returns and financial leverage are included as Size, NIM, 
and EC_A.  
Return on Assets 
Similar to Return on Equity, Return on Assets is a measure of profitability. The ratio is 
more simple, however, defined as 
 #:O = 	 <?2	=@ABC?IB2EF	JGG?2G  (Eq. 6) 
This ratio shows how a company profits from managing their assets to generate earnings. 
The higher the ratio percentage is, the more a company is earning on less investment. Where 
ROE is comparable between different companies across different markets at times, ROA is more 
limited in how it should be used for comparison. ROA is a ratio accepted to be suitable for 
comparison between previous ROA measures recorded within the same company and ROA 
measures of a similar company.  
Liquidity Risk 
While ROE and ROA both measure a company’s performance, measuring liquidity is a 
way to evaluate a company’s financial health. Liquidity ratios show a company’s capacity to pay 
off short term debts. “Liquidity is generally defined as the ability of a financial firm to meet its 
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debt obligations without incurring unacceptably large losses” (Lopez 2008). Liquidity risk for a 
deposit institution, such as a bank, occurs when there is an inability to pay those debt obligations. 
Specifically, deposit institutions face liquidity risk from “ongoing conduct of business…and the 
subsequent need to meet those demands through liquidating assets or borrowing funds” 
(Saunders, Cornett 2011). “Financial firms are especially sensitive to funding liquidity risk since 
debt maturity transformation…is one of their key business areas” (Lopez 2008). For financial 
firms, it is important to manage and examine this risk, at times on a daily basis.  
There are different ways to measure a deposit institution’s liquidity exposure; for this 
paper the method used is analyzing the financing gap. As defined by Saunders and Cornett, a 
financing gap is the difference between the average loans and average deposits of the institution 
(2011). By managing this risk, institutions are able to “identify potential future funding 
problems” (Lopez 2008). Especially after the financial crisis of 2008, managing liquidity risk is 
important for all types of financial institutions; thus its inclusion in this analysis. For the sake of 
this paper, liquidity risk is defined as the financing gap ratio: 
 )PQRPST	#PUV = 	<WW3	=X_Z<WW  (Eq. 7) 
with NLL representing net loans and leases and IB_D representing interest-bearing Deposits. 
Panel Data Analysis 
Panel data is appropriate for this analysis because it allows inclusion of data that 
represents the “behavior of entities observed across time” (Torres-Reyna 2007). Thus, it allows 
for data across multiple years and multiple entities in a single dataset that can be analyzed. Panel 
data also allows for data outside the entities being analyzed, even to the point that the analysis 
can “control variables you cannot observe or measure like cultural factors or difference in 
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business practices across companies; or variables that change over time but not across entities” 
(Torres-Reyna 2007).  
The data set is first declared to be panel data so STATA recognizes it when running 
regressions. “Bank_ID” represents the entities and “Year” represents the annual time variable (t). 
As not all banks had data for all years, the dataset was declared unbalanced.  
Torres-Reyna explains when Random effects is an appropriate method to apply to panel 
data:  
The rationale behind random effects model is that, unlike the fixed effects model, the 
variation across entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor or 
independent variables included in the model...If you have reason to believe that 
differences across entities have some influence on your dependent variable then you 
should use random effects. An advantage of random effects is that you can include time 
invariant variables. In the fixed effects model these variables are absorbed by the 
intercept. 
The standard random effects model is:  
 [M2 = 	\]M2 + &	 +	RM + ^2 + _M2 (Eq. 8) 
where [M2 is the dependent variable where i = entity and t = time.  ]M2 represents independent 
variables with \ as the coefficient for the independent variables. The intercept is represented by &,	 RM is the entity error term and ^2 is the time error term and _M2 is the remaining random error 
term. Using this regression model, the assumption is made “that the bank’s error term is not 
correlated with the predictors, allowing for time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory 
variables” (Torres-Reyna 2007).  
 
 31 
Return on Equity Model 
This model provides an economic analysis of the factors on return on equity of North 
Dakota banks. Within the analysis, factors that are both internal and external to bank operations 
are included. In order to examine the relationships between return on equity and the bank-
specific, agricultural and macroeconomic variables, the panel fixed effect regression model was 
developed to be defined as:  
 #:(M2 = 	 aM + bcXcd4 ΠM2c + fGDGd4 Π2G + gChCd4 Π2C + iM2	  (Eq. 9) 
where #:(M2 is return on equity of ith bank at time t, with i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T. ΠM2c , Πj2G , Πj2C are 
bank-specific, agricultural and macroeconomic variables b=1,…,B, s=1,…,S, m=1,…,M, 
respectively. c is a constant term; iM2	is the error term.  
Extending Equation 9 to reflect the variables, as summarized in Table 2, the model is 
formulated as follows:  
 #:(M2 = 	 aM	 + 	b4kPlmM2 +	bnOop"qVM2 +	br(00M2 +	bs/1tM2   
 +	bu(v_OM2 +	bw/v:_))M2 +	bx0_)/M2 +	byv_)/M2  
 +	bz1_)/M2 +	b4{:_)/M2 +	b440_)/_6M2 +	b4n|_)/_6M2  (Eq. 10) 
 +	f40_!:)2 + fn0_!:)_12 
 +	g46782 +	gnv}PUPU2  
Bank-specific variables include natural log of total assets (Size), farm loan portfolio  
greater than or equal to 25% indicator variable (AgBank), efficiency ratio (EFF), net interest 
margin (NIM), equity capital to assets ratio (EC_A), net charge offs to loans and leases ratio 
(NCO_LL), farm loan portfolio percentage (F_LN), commercial loan portfolio percentage 
(C_LN), individual loan portfolio percentage (I_LN), other loans portfolio percentage (O_LN), 
annual farm loan growth (F_LN_G), and annual total loan growth (T_LN_G). 
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The agricultural variables included were farm income volatility (F_VOL), and a one year 
lagged version of farm income volatility (F_VOL_1). These variables captured information 
regarding fluctuations in the agricultural economy. 
Macroeconomic variables include annual change in gross domestic product (GDP) and an 
indicator variable for the year 2008 representing the financial crisis of 2008 (Crisis).   
Equation 10 is first estimated through fixed effects regression taking each bank’s return 
on equity ratio as the dependent variable. It was tested with the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier for random effects and the null hypothesis that variances across entities is zero was 
rejected, indicating random effects is a suitable model. Thus, we used random effects rather than 
fixed effects model. 
Return on Assets Model 
This model provides an economic analysis of the factors on return on assets of North 
Dakota banks. Within the analysis, factors that are both internal and external to bank operations 
are included. In order to examine the relationships between return on assets and the bank-
specific, agricultural and macroeconomic variables, the panel fixed effect regression model was 
developed to be defined as:  
 #:OM2 = 	 aM + bcXcd4 ΠM2c + fGDGd4 Π2G + gChCd4 Π2C + iM2	  (Eq. 11) 
where #:OM2 is return on assets of ith bank at time t, with i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T. ΠM2c , Πj2G , Πj2C are 
bank-specific, agricultural and macroeconomic variables b=1,…,B, s=1,…,S, m=1,…,M, 
respectively. c is a constant term; iM2	is the error term.   
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Extending Equation 11 to reflect the variables, as summarized in Table 2, the model is 
formulated as follows:  
 #:OM2 = 	 aM	 + 	b4kPlmM2 +	bnOop"qVM2 +	br(00M2 +	bs/1tM2  
 +	bu(v_OM2 +	bw/v:_))M2 +	bx0_)/M2 +	byv_)/M2  
 +	bz1_)/M2 +	b4{:_)/M2 +	b440_)/_6M2 +	b4n|_)/_6M2  (Eq. 12) 
 +	f40_!:)2 + fn0_!:)_12 
 +	g46782 +	gnv}PUPU2  
Bank-specific variables include natural log of total assets (Size), farm loan portfolio  
greater than or equal to 25% indicator variable (AgBank), efficiency ratio (EFF), net interest 
margin (NIM), equity capital to assets ratio (EC_A), net charge offs to loans and leases ratio 
(NCO_LL), farm loan portfolio percentage (F_LN), commercial loan portfolio percentage 
(C_LN), individual loan portfolio percentage (I_LN), other loans portfolio percentage (O_LN), 
annual farm loan growth (F_LN_G), and annual total loan growth (T_LN_G). 
The agricultural variables included were farm income volatility (F_VOL), and a one year 
lagged version of farm income volatility (F_VOL_1). These variables captured information 
regarding fluctuations in the agricultural economy.  
Macroeconomic variables include annual change in gross domestic product (GDP) and an 
indicator variable for the year 2008 representing the financial crisis of 2008 (Crisis).   
Equation 12 is estimated first through fixed effects regression taking each bank’s Return 
on Assets ratio as the dependent variable. It was tested with the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier for random effects and the null hypothesis that variances across entities is zero was 
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rejected, indicating random effects is a suitable model. Thus, we used random effects rather than 
fixed effects model.    
Liquidity Risk Model 
This model provides an economic analysis of the factors on liquidity risk of North Dakota 
banks. Within the analysis, factors that are both internal and external to bank operations are 
included. In order to examine the relationships between liquidity risk and the bank-specific, 
agricultural and macroeconomic variables, the panel fixed effect regression model was 
developed to be defined as:  
 )M2 = 	 aM + bcXcd4 ΠM2c + fGDGd4 Π2G + gChCd4 Π2C + iM2	  (Eq. 13) 
where )M2 is liquidity risk of ith bank at time t, with i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T. In this study, it is the 
financing gap ratio. ΠM2c , Πj2G , Πj2C are bank-specific, agricultural and macroeconomic variables 
b=1,…,B, s=1,…,S, m=1,…,M, respectively. c is a constant term; iM2	is the error term.  
Extending Equation 13 to reflect the variables, as summarized in Table 2, the model is 
formulated as follows:  
 )M2 = 	 aM	 + 	b4#:(M2 +	bn#:OM2 +	brkPlmM2 +	bsOop"qVM2 +	bu(00M2  
 +	bw/1tM2 +	bx(v_OM2 +	by/v:_))M2 +	bz0_)/M2 +	b4{v_)/M2 
 +	b441_)/M2 +	b4n:_)/M2 +	b4r0_)/_6M2 +	b4s|_)/_6M2  (Eq. 14) 
 +	f40_!:)2 + fn0_!:)_12 
 +	g46782 +	gnv}PUPU2  
Bank-specific variables include return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), natural 
log of total assets (Size), farm loan portfolio greater than or equal to 25% indicator variable 
(AgBank), efficiency ratio (EFF), net interest margin (NIM), equity capital to assets ratio 
(EC_A), net charge offs to loans and leases ratio (NCO_LL), farm loan portfolio percentage 
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(F_LN), commercial loan portfolio percentage (C_LN), individual loan portfolio percentage 
(I_LN), other loans portfolio percentage (O_LN), annual farm loan growth (F_LN_G), and 
annual total loan growth (T_LN_G). 
The agricultural variables included were farm income volatility (F_VOL), and a one year 
lagged version of farm income volatility (F_VOL_1). These variables captured information 
regarding fluctuations in the agricultural economy.  
Macroeconomic variables include annual change in gross domestic product (GDP) and an 
indicator variable for the year 2008 representing the financial crisis of 2008 (Crisis).   
Equation 14 is first estimated through fixed effects regression taking each bank’s 
liquidity risk ratio as the dependent variable. It was tested with the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier for random effects and the null hypothesis that variances across entities is zero was 
rejected, indicating random effects is a suitable model. Thus, we used random effects rather than 
fixed effects model. 
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RESULTS  
Analyzing panel data can take many forms. For this study, the data is analyzed through 
the random effects model to allow for individual effects. Because we have “reason to believe that 
differences across entities have some influence on [the] dependent variable” it is acceptable to 
apply random effects regression to this panel data set (Torres-Reyna 2007). Using the program 
STATA, the data was analyzed to see if random effects was the proper method before taking the 
results as appropriate and sound. 
Table 3 
Levin-Lin-Chu Unit-Root Test Results 
Variable 
Adjusted t* 
Statistic p-value Stationarity 
Liquidity Risk -5.6783 0.0000 * 
ROE -8.2622 0.0000 * 
ROA -11.5184 0.0000 * 
Size -3.6157 0.0001 * 
F_VOL -3.8681 0.0001 * 
F_VOL_1 -1.9813 0.0238 * 
GDP -17.7242 0.0000 * 
EFF -10.3304 0.0000 * 
NIM -10.8252 0.0000 * 
EC_A -7.4889 0.0000 * 
NCO_LL -35.5801 0.0000 * 
F_LN -5.5984 0.0000 * 
C_LN -9.4348 0.0000 * 
I_LN -10.0936 0.0000 * 
O_LN -17.8517 0.0000  
F_LN_G 8.0742 1.0000  
D.F_LN_G -0.5783 0.2815 * 
D2.F_LN_G -5.6502 0.0000  
T_LN_G 12.1934 1.0000  
D.T_LN_G 10.8707 1.0000  
D2.T_LN_G 1.8881 0.9705  
D3.T_LN_G -17.2905 0.0000 * 
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The process began with declaring the data as panel data and then testing individual 
variables for the presence of unit roots. The Levin-Lin-Chu test has a null hypothesis that the 
series contains a unit root and an alternative hypothesis of the series being stationary. Results 
from these tests can be found in Table 3 with * denoting stationarity. The variables that required 
being differenced to achieve stationarity were omitted from the regression due to differing levels 
of stationarity from the bulk of the data.  
With stationarity established, the fixed effects version of the regression was tested for 
homoskedasticity and autocorrelation. The Modified Wald test has a null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity, or constant variance. Results shown in Table 4 show that for all three models 
the null hypothesis was rejected and thus the data is heteroskedastic.  
Table 4 
Modified Wald Test Results for Heteroskedasticity 
 ROE ROA Liquidity Risk 
chi2 (77) 3976.6 4496.41 8527.86 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
To test for autocorrelation in the panel data the Wooldridge test was utilized. The 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data has a null hypothesis that there is no first order 
autocorrelation. Table 5 shows the results of this test on the three models which indicate the 
presence of first-order autocorrelation.  
Table 5 
Wooldridge Test Results for Autocorrelation  
 ROE ROA Liquidity Risk 
F(  1, 76) 1462.102 1429.865 0.924 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.3395 
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To correct for the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation found in the data, the random 
effects regression was adjusted to cluster the panel data on the Bank ID variable to produce 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard error. After this random effects regression was produced with 
robust standard errors, the Bruesch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) was utilized to determine 
whether fixed or random effects regression is appropriate to use. Results from the tests on the 
three models are shown in Table 6. The null hypothesis in the Bruesch-Pagan LM test is that 
variances across entities in the panel data is zero. In these models, the null hypothesis is rejected 
and thus we conclude that random effects is appropriate.   
Table 6 
Bruesch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test Results 
 ROE ROA Liquidity Risk 
chibar2(01) 576.72 418.14 862.63 
Prob > chibar2 0 0 0 
 
The next step is evaluating the regression results directly, identifying statistically 
significant variables, and interpreting their coefficients. Variable statistical significance, at the 
95% confidence level, is based on the p-value statistic returned in the regression. P-values less 
than 0.10 indicate significance at the 10% level, values less than 0.05 indicates significance at 
the 5% level and values less than 0.01 indicates significance at the 1% level. This significance is 
denoted in Table 7 by *, **, and ***, respectively. Size, farm income volatility, and individual 
loan portfolio percentage were significant across all three models with varying significance. 
Similarities were seen in the variables significant to return on equity and return on assets with 
size, farm income volatility, lagged farm income volatility, crisis indicator, efficiency ratio, net 
charge offs to loans and leases ratio and farm, commercial and individual loan portfolio 
percentages significant to both regressions.  
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Table 7 
Regression Results  
 ROE  ROA  Liquidity Risk  
ROE -  -  0.2863026  
ROA -  -  -2.523282  
Size 0.0209906 *** 0.0014934 *** 0.0378994 *** 
AgBank -0.0098073  -0.0009849  0.0361181 ** 
F_VOL 0.0122225 *** 0.0012556 *** -0.00916 * 
F_VOL_1 -0.0148013 *** -0.0014186 *** -0.0074832  
GDP 0.0322406  0.0054607  -0.9285094 * 
Crisis -0.0092417 *** -0.0007288 *** -0.0182534  
EFF -0.204724 *** -0.0199922 *** 0.0154417  
NIM -0.4936163  -0.0651498  5.332871 *** 
EC_A -0.3647406 *** 0.0095821  0.5358623  
NCO_LL 1.203912 *** 0.1134388 *** -0.3443637  
F_LN 0.1664664 *** 0.0168103 *** -0.0467685  
C_LN 0.1613894 *** 0.0157175 *** 0.1554601  
I_LN 0.1700399 *** 0.0149854 ** -0.3206503 * 
O_LN 0.057013  0.0051927  0.0738626  
_cons -0.0212642  0.0001753  -0.6584419  
 
In the model with return on equity as the dependent variable ten of the fourteen variables 
included were found to be significant at the 1% level. The size variable returned a positive 
coefficient which confirms the idea that bigger banks have an advantage of economies of scale in 
that the more assets a bank has the higher the returns they have the potential to earn. As farm 
income volatility increases so does return on equity as shown by the positive coefficient. This 
follows the idea that when farms have higher profits, they’re able to pay off their debt owed to 
the bank. Farm income volatility lagged one period was significant with a negative coefficient. If 
F_VOL in time t-1 was positive, it implies that farm income increased, thus it could be inferred 
that the operators used the income to pay off their debts with the bank. If they pay off their debts 
in time t-1 it would decrease the bank’s assets going in to time t and thus decrease returns 
slightly as the assets are lower than the year before. The crisis indicator variable returned a 
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negative coefficient indicating the negative market fluctuation that occurred in 2008 because of 
the financial crisis decreasing returns overall. Efficiency also had a negative coefficient which 
could indicate that the higher the efficiency ratio, the more money is going to operating expenses 
instead of staying income for the bank. A lower efficiency ratio is desired, however, only when it 
indicate a lower percentage of net income going towards operating expenses. Equity capital to 
assets returned a negative coefficient which indicates an inverse relationship between this ratio 
and return on equity. For the equity capital to assets ratio to increase either equity capital has to 
increase or assets has to decrease, or both. If this increase in equity capital to assets ratio stems 
from an increase in equity capital while income remains the same, it logically follows that the 
ratio of return on equity would decrease. The positive coefficient for the net charge offs to loans 
and leases ratio indicates the effect of writing loans off of the balance sheet. Artificially reducing 
assets on the balance sheet in this way tends to boost return on equity measures because of the 
elimination of unproductive assets. Farm, commercial and individual loan portfolio percentages 
were all found to be statistically significant and returned positive coefficients. This is a logical 
conclusion that with more loans offered, it indicates an increase in earning assets, net income and 
interest income while equity remains the same which in turn increases the ratio of return to 
equity.  
Given the similar statistical significance among the variables for the return on equity 
regression, examining the magnitude of the coefficients continues to explain the results. Net 
charge offs to loans and leases returned the highest coefficient, with a 1.00% change in the ratio 
there is a corresponding 1.204% change in return on equity. The crisis indicator variable returned 
the second highest coefficient indicating that in 2008 return on equity decreased by 0.92%. 
Efficiency and equity capital to assets returned similar coefficients of -0.205% and -0.365% 
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respectively. Farm, commercial and individual loan portfolio percentages returned similar 
coefficients as well, 0.166%, 0.161%, 0.170% respectively. Farm volatility returned a coefficient 
of 0.012% while the lagged farm volatility returned a coefficient of similar magnitude but the 
opposite sign of -0.015%. The size variable returned a positive coefficient of 0.021%. 
In the model with return on assets as the dependent variable nine of the fourteen variables 
included were found to be significant at the 1% level. The size variable returned a positive 
coefficient which confirms the idea that bigger banks have an advantage of economies of scale in 
that the more assets a bank has the higher the returns they have the potential to earn. As farm 
income volatility increases so does return on assets as shown by the positive coefficient. This 
follows the idea that when farms have higher profits, they’re able to pay off their debt owed to 
the bank, increasing interest income from current assets. Farm income volatility lagged one 
period was significant with a negative coefficient. If F_VOL in time t-1 was positive, it implies 
that farm income increased, thus it could be inferred that the operators used the income to pay off 
their debts with the bank. If they pay off their debts in time t-1 it would decrease the bank’s 
assets going in to time t and thus decrease returns slightly as the assets are lower than the year 
before.  The crisis indicator variable returned a negative coefficient indicating the negative 
market fluctuation that occurred in 2008 because of the financial crisis decreased returns overall. 
Efficiency also had a negative coefficient which could indicate that the higher the efficiency 
ratio, the more money is going to operating expenses instead of staying income for the bank. A 
lower efficiency ratio is desired, however, only when it indicate a lower percentage of net 
income going towards operating expenses. The positive coefficient for the net charge offs to 
loans and leases ratio indicates the effect of writing loans off of the balance sheet. Artificially 
reducing assets on the balance sheet in this way tends to boost return on equity measures because 
 42 
of the elimination of unproductive assets. Farm, commercial and individual loan portfolio 
percentages were all found to be statistically significant and returned positive coefficients. This 
is a logical conclusion that with more loans offered, it indicates an increase in earning assets, net 
income and interest income while equity remains the same which in turn increases the ratio of 
return to equity.  
Given the similar statistical significance among the variables for the return on assets 
regression, examining the magnitude of the coefficients continues to explain the results. Net 
charge offs to loans and leases returned the highest coefficient, with a 1.00% change in the ratio 
there is a corresponding 0.113% change in return on assets. The crisis indicator variable returned 
the second highest coefficient indicating that in 2008 return on equity decreased by 0.070%. 
Efficiency returned a coefficients of -0.020%. Farm, commercial and individual loan portfolio 
percentages returned similar coefficients as well, 0.016%, 0.015%, 0.015% respectively. Farm 
volatility returned a coefficient of 0.0013% while the lagged farm volatility returned a coefficient 
of similar magnitude but the opposite sign of -0.0014%. The size variable returned a positive 
coefficient of 0.0015%. 
In the model with liquidity risk as the dependent variable six of the sixteen variables 
included were found to be significant. Size and net interest margin were statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The AgBank indicator variable was statistically significant at the 5% level and 
the remaining three significant variables, farm income volatility, GDP and individual loans, were 
significant at the 10% level.  
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A reminder that liquidity risk is defined as the financing gap in this analysis which was 
calculated as:  
 )PQRPST	#PUV = 	<WW3	=X_Z<WW  (Eq. 7) 
with NLL representing net loans and leases and IB_D representing interest-bearing deposits. The 
positive coefficient of 0.038% that was returned on the size variable can be explained through 
the logic that when assets increase (loans and leases) it will increase the liquidity ratio. The same 
holds true for the AgBank variable returning a positive coefficient of 3.60%. As an indicator 
variable of the bank maintaining 25% or more in their loan portfolio as farm loans, it follows that 
as this increases so will liquidity risk ratio. The negative coefficient returned for farm income 
volatility, -0.0092%, shows the inverse relationship between farm income percent change and the 
financing gap. When farm income volatility decreases, liquidity risk increases because as farms 
incur less income, they rely on their existing cash balances. This would indicate their debt 
remains the same while their interest bearing deposit balance decreases which in turn decreases 
the liquidity risk ratio. The variable representing percent change in US GDP returned a 
coefficient of -0.9285. This is interpreted that as GDP percent change falls it increases liquidity 
risk because the change will be negative and combined with a negative coefficient value 
logically this will return a positive value. Net interest margin is the difference between interest 
income and interest expense. In the business of a bank this is translated to income from interest 
on loans minus expense from interest on deposit accounts. The regression returned a positive 
5.333% coefficient for net interest margin. This is logically validated by the concept of a high net 
interest margin indicating that more income is being generated from loans than expense being 
generated on deposit accounts. A high net interest margin indicates more loans and returns on 
loans which increases the liquidity risk ratio. At first glance, correlation between net interest 
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margin and liquidity risk was expected to be high but as shown in Table A2 they are not 
excessively correlated. Finally, the variable representing individual loan portfolio percentage 
returned a negative coefficient of -0.3207. As individuals tend to be predictable in their 
repayment capacity and credit history as well as borrowing smaller amounts, it follows, that 
more individual loans would decrease liquidity risk for a financial institution.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
Economic conditions are growing more codependent between nations across the globe. 
With each industry becoming more dependent on one another, seeing change in one industry is 
starting to show effects in other industries. In rural areas, agriculture and finance industries are 
exhibiting such behaviors. Agriculture businesses require financing to operate and financial 
institutions require a demand for credit. 
Both agriculture and financial businesses operate with inherent risk. The financial crisis 
of 2008 reminded financial institutions the importance of managing their risk. The recent 
downturn in commodity prices reiterated the same to agricultural businesses. With increased 
restrictions on and examinations of credit requests, financial institutions have an impact on 
agriculture financing opportunities. With world commodity competition and price behavior, US 
farmers have sought to lean more heavily on financing opportunities to remain in business. This 
vital relationship between agricultural businesses and financial institutions required further 
evaluation.  
Financial institutions, at their core, are an intermediary. They take in deposits and then 
lend those funds out to earn profits on interest income. Their assets are their loans which are the 
main source of income for the institution. Understanding the business being financed with bank 
credit is important for the bank to evaluate the risk associated with that particular loan.  
To measure the health of any business implies examining different aspects of 
performance. Profitability is a highly utilized measure of performance; knowing how much a 
company is able to profit from their operations.  
Risk faced by operations is also vital to understanding how a business is operating. In the 
case of financial institutions, liquidity risk and credit risk are two of the main ten risks faced by 
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their operations. Credit risk is a measure of the risk exposure due to lending credit. Knowing 
information on the individual or business the credit is being extended to gives information on the 
level of risk associated with that particular asset. Liquidity risk is a measure of risk exposure 
more related to the financial structure of the institution. Having liquidity is to have available 
funds to pay off debt obligations without a huge loss of income. Having a gap between average 
loans and average deposits is known as the financing gap and is a common measure of liquidity 
risk.  
We examined bank performance in North Dakota through three performance measures: 
return on equity, return on assets, liquidity risk. For each measure a model was created to 
examine the relationship between performance with bank structure, agricultural and 
macroeconomic factors.  
Bank structure variables included size in assets, indicator of farm loans greater than or 
equal to 25% of the total loan portfolio, efficiency, net interest margin, equity capital to assets 
ratio, net charge offs to loans and leases ratio, and loan portfolio percentages for farm, 
commercial, individual and other loans. Measure of farm loan and total loan growth were 
included in the initial model but omitted after found to be nonstationary variables.  
Agricultural factors were represented by farm income volatility and a lagged farm income 
volatility variable.  
Macroeconomic factors were represented by annual percentage growth in US gross 
domestic product. An indicator variable for the year 2008 was also included to represent the 
financial crisis of that year.  
In order to understand the relationships in the model, across both time and bank entity, a 
random effects regression model was used to examine the panel data. As random effects 
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regression model has the fundamental rationale that “variation across entities is assumed to be 
random and uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included in the model” it 
was deemed appropriate to use (Torres-Reyna 2007). Once the model was built, 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation was accounted for through clustered data and 
heteroskedastic robust standard errors, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test was used to 
confirm the appropriateness of using a random effects regression model.  
The results for each model were evaluated separately as different measures of 
performance. Return on equity and return on assets, however, showed similarities in significant 
variables. The return on equity model alone presented a significant relationship between the 
equity capital to assets ratio. Size, farm volatility, lagged farm volatility, crisis indicator, 
efficiency ratio, net charge offs to loans and leases, farm loans, commercial loans, and individual 
loans were all significant to both the return on equity and return on assets models.  
The liquidity risk model presented different significant relationships than the profitability 
models. The variables with highest significance in affecting the financing gap of a bank were the 
size of the bank and the net interest margin. The total assets measure is important to evaluate 
because as assets increase, liabilities need to increase as well lest the financing gap grow too 
large and increase their risk exposure. Similarly, the net interest margin is important because of 
the indication of where income is being generated. As assets increase, so does interest income 
and thus the liquidity risk increases as well. Other significant variables to the liquidity risk model 
included the AgBank indicator variable, farm volatility, percent change in gross domestic 
product and individual loans.   
The balance of significant relationships between internal factors, macroeconomic factors 
and agricultural factors shows that banks have multiple areas of operation that require 
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monitoring. Management of internal financial structuring as well as examining, not only the 
credit risk associated with financing businesses, farms and individuals, but also current economic 
conditions to get an accurate picture of their risk exposure, is essential to understanding potential 
fluctuations in profitability.  
To continue this research many avenues could be taken. More focus could be put on 
internal structure as well as other inherent risks faced by financial institutions. Additional 
agricultural variables could be included such as commodity price volatility and more measures of 
farm performance beyond net income volatility. Increasing the area examined from a single state 
to a region or a national study would increase the usefulness of results, while decreasing 
likelihood of available data to evaluate. Further models of performance could also be built to 
include solvency and efficiency ratios which would cover the four main types of business 
performance.  
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APPENDIX 
	
Table A1 
Variable Descriptions  
Category Variable Description  
Panel Identifiers B_ID Each of the 77 banks in the data set were assigned an ID 
number (1-77) 
 Year The data utilized was the reported figure for December 
31st of the shown year 
Performance 
Measures 
LquidityRisk Liquidity risk was calculated using (Net Loans and 
Leases - Interest Bearing Deposits)/Total Assets) 
 ROE ROE was taken directly from bank financial statements 
representing the company's Return on Equity 
 ROA ROA was taken directly from bank financial statements 
representing the company's Return on Assets 
Bank-Specific Size  Size of the bank is represented as the natural log of Total 
Assets 
 AgBank 
A dummy variable indicating a "1" if the bank has more 
than 25% of its loan portfolio devoted to farm loans 
 EFF Efficiency ratio was taken directly from bank financial 
statements  
 NIM Net Interest margin was taken directly from bank 
financial statements 
 EC_A Equity Capital to Assets ratio  
 NCO_LL Net Charge offs to Loans and Leases ratio 
 F_LN Farm Loan percentage of total loans 
 C_LN Commercial Loan percentage of Total Loans 
 I_LN Individual Loan percentage of Total Loans 
 O_LN Other Loan percentage of Total Loans 
 F_LN_G Farm Loan growth on an annual basis  
 T_LN_G Total Loan growth on an annual basis 
Macroeconomic GDP  Annual GDP percentage growth  
 Crisis  A dummy variable indicating a "1" if the year recorded 
is 2008 
Farm Economy  F_VOL Farm Volatility is a measure of changes in farm income 
across the state of North Dakota 
  
Table A2 
Correlation Matrix 
  
Liquidity 
Risk ROE ROA Size AgBank F_VOL F_VOL_1 GDP Crisis EFF NIM EC_A NCO_LL F_LN C_LN I_LN O_LN 
Liquidity 
Risk 1                 
ROE 0.040 1                
ROA -0.022 0.928 1               
Size 0.366 0.257 0.151 1              
AgBank -0.078 0.079 0.125 -0.423 1             
F_VOL -0.094 -0.002 0.012 -0.067 0.021 1            
F_VOL_1 -0.114 -0.114 -0.119 0.033 0.003 0.736 1           
GDP -0.043 -0.041 -0.045 0.017 -0.026 -0.449 -0.106 1          
Crisis 0.035 0.066 0.075 -0.045 0.016 0.231 -0.186 -0.726 1         
EFF -0.019 -0.663 -0.694 -0.257 -0.121 0.120 0.071 -0.078 0.029 1        
NIM 0.393 0.147 0.127 0.014 0.043 0.114 -0.011 -0.003 0.021 -0.133 1       
EC_A -0.125 -0.079 0.192 -0.161 0.016 -0.041 -0.079 0.034 -0.018 -0.150 0.013 1      
NCO_LL -0.002 -0.060 -0.067 0.027 -0.078 0.275 0.142 -0.177 0.077 0.203 0.044 -0.116 1     
F_LN -0.085 0.146 0.208 -0.472 0.829 -0.029 -0.021 -0.003 -0.003 -0.182 0.051 0.095 -0.132 1    
C_LN 0.054 0.091 0.045 0.254 -0.482 0.029 -0.053 -0.020 0.056 -0.011 0.041 -0.116 0.100 -0.588 1   
I_LN -0.285 -0.092 -0.075 -0.136 -0.140 0.069 -0.018 -0.010 0.031 0.172 -0.057 0.140 0.068 -0.223 -0.075 1  
O_LN -0.057 -0.156 -0.177 -0.086 -0.122 0.000 0.009 0.013 -0.017 0.212 -0.029 -0.097 0.024 -0.136 -0.041 -0.057 1 
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Table A3  
Annual Trend Data  
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Average of Lquidity 
Risk -4.84% -5.81% -5.91% -4.23% -4.94% -8.69% -9.67% -5.64% -5.19% -1.39% 
Average of ROE 11.43% 11.56% 11.75% 11.47% 10.82% 9.71% 8.88% 8.66% 9.31% 10.35% 
Average of ROA 1.15% 1.16% 1.17% 1.14% 1.07% 0.96% 0.87% 0.84% 0.90% 0.98% 
Average of F_VOL 3.8806 4.8138 4.8872 6.4620 7.3202 7.4547 6.6992 5.0382 3.7698 3.1853 
Average of GDP  0.0652 0.0512 0.0440 -0.0092 0.0011 0.0456 0.0364 0.0324 0.0405 0.0388 
Average of AgBank 0.6104 0.5974 0.5584 0.6104 0.6234 0.5974 0.5714 0.5844 0.5714 0.5844 
Average of EFF 0.6398 0.6519 0.6637 0.6762 0.7011 0.6804 0.6748 0.6429 0.6542 0.6424 
Average of Size  11.1639 11.2447 11.3298 11.4184 11.4866 11.5460 11.6434 11.7295 11.7761 11.8438 
Average of NIM 0.0435 0.0424 0.0415 0.0401 0.0405 0.0401 0.0393 0.0391 0.0370 0.0375 
Average of EC_A 0.1005 0.1006 0.0987 0.0950 0.0957 0.0935 0.0952 0.0950 0.0925 0.0980 
Average of NCO_LL 0.0019 0.0025 0.0035 0.0047 0.0073 0.0051 0.0031 0.0020 0.0001 0.0003 
Average of F_LN 0.3018 0.2968 0.2906 0.2953 0.2982 0.2886 0.2867 0.3042 0.3019 0.3092 
Average of C_LN 0.1713 0.1765 0.1760 0.1705 0.1570 0.1503 0.1500 0.1455 0.1455 0.1391 
Average of I_LN 0.0973 0.0916 0.0874 0.0808 0.0796 0.0766 0.0728 0.0667 0.0641 0.0588 
Average of O_LN 0.0351 0.0356 0.0368 0.0338 0.0367 0.0392 0.0352 0.0371 0.0373 0.0365 
Average of F_LN_G 0.0899 0.0579 0.1285 0.2391 -0.0088 0.0551 0.1911 0.2985 0.1647 0.1050 
Average of T_LN_G 0.1116 0.0713 0.1019 0.0766 0.0235 0.0500 0.1267 0.0580 0.1287 0.6555 
Average of C_CoV 0.0494 0.1500 0.2086 0.1608 0.0469 0.1826 0.0970 0.0324 0.1353 0.0495 
Average of S_CoV 0.0334 0.1097 0.1764 0.0792 0.0167 0.1075 0.1161 0.0255 0.0535 0.0504 
Average of W_CoV 0.0755 0.1020 0.2152 0.1121 0.0528 0.1917 0.0396 0.0522 0.0363 0.0747 
Average of NET_CO 96.5385 219.6667 376.3375 611.7000 1215.8250 965.0750 521.6875 308.1875 11.6375 71.0750 
Average of 
TOTAL_LL 97828.55 109567.29 116854.45 129923.94 138010.84 141011.46 153228.45 174779.30 190892.51 216247.78 
% change Net_CO 8.58% 127.54% 71.32% 62.54% 98.76% -20.62% -45.94% -40.92% -96.22% 510.74% 
% change 
TOTAL_LL 12.53% 12.00% 6.65% 11.18% 6.22% 2.17% 8.66% 14.06% 9.22% 13.28% 
Average of NET_CO 96.5385 219.6667 376.3375 611.7000 1215.8250 965.0750 521.6875 308.1875 11.6375 71.0750 
Average of 
TOTAL_LL 97828.55 109567.29 116854.45 129923.94 138010.84 141011.46 153228.45 174779.30 190892.51 216247.78 
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